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FROM ONE TO THE OTHER: PROBLEM AND/OR APORIA
Jelisaveta Blagojevic
Belgrade Women's Studies Cellter
In any instanr, from the vcl)'
beginning of the game, world,
public spaee. body, bcing·in-
common. e:o..tension of the soul -
distance of the most proximal, and
step (not) across. From the cup to
the lips, frolll the Tarpellm Rock to
the Capitol, from Charybdis to
Scylla, from one border to the other,
from one wall to the other from one
lip to the other, from you to me,
from one time to the other. (Nancy,
1997, p. 67)
My intention in this work is Il) think and re-think the concept of subjectivity (as
well as its political implicarions) through considering the concepts of love and jealousy
insofar as thev interconnect in the structure ofsubiectivity throuQh the figure of the Other.
r..10reover, I 'will attempt to re-think the concept of subjecti;ity as something that is
revealing itself as constructed by jealousy as its own strategy' -namely, the strategy of
subjectivity. In and through this re-thinking, I wjJl consider [he notions of possession (of
the Llther), appropriation (of the other), and re-appropriation (Llfthe sell)
But let me here, for Cl moment, recall Desc<lrtes' concept of cogito, in order to try
to shm,,' tha[, first of all, the concept of jealousy is in the core of the emerging of an "F',
regardless of \vhcther it is constituted as cogito, or self-consciousness, or spirit, or subject
Namezy, jealousy is directly connected with the concept ofpussession and appropriation of
the other, insofar as Descartes' concept of cogito, as well as his definition of jealousy. is
basc.d on the belief that one can possess oneself, and thus consequently, that one can
possess the other.
Political consequences of this claim are in keeping with modern political
philosophy and its concept of the \politica[) subject. As opposed to this, contemporary
political philosophy (French) gives rise to the concept or lhe singular being.
I will use the notion of subject:ivilv in the sense of the self-appropriating
consciousness, in the sense of the self as S{!!i~c()nsciousness, in the sense of the selj~
rejlective and self-affect/re stnlcture that IS capable, by its very nature, of producing itself
from itself (through the figure of the other as its own and thus the opposable other).
Also, I would like to relate this discussion to the question of sexual difference, In
this respect, I would like to emphasize the differentiation between the concept of "subject"
as empowered by being at the very place of politics (understood as political subject) and by
Irreplaceability
of a projection and protectwn of the subject, but jealousy as an experience of what is
coming and going to happen.
What is one of the most important questions, considering the topic of this paper is
-is it possible to think jealousy in relation to the singular being, the being that is unique in
the sense of not being an individual and auto/nomous being in order to be a being?
Furthermore, following this context I would like to pose another question: considering the
notion ofjealousy in relation to the concept of singularity, is it possible to decide if jealousy
as such is related, and if it is, in which sense, to the question of sexual difference? Could
one relate, and if yes, how, the concept of singularity, the concept of the 'singular being' -
the being which is by her disip{acement, by her ex-position to the other and thus by her
constant "break" (of the heart) that what it is- to the notion of jealousy? Although defined
as the ahsence of any strategy, can a singular being be jealous? And if it can, in what
possible sense? Is a singular being, thanks to the absence of any strategy, a non-jealous
being? Or, perhaps is it possible to see the very place of the absence of any strategy as the
strategy par exceliance?
Is it not necessary that there should be non-strategv, non~thinking. non-politics,
non-presentability. non-language, non-appropriation non-jealousy, in order to be a strategy,
a thinking, a politics. a presentation. a language, an appropriation, ajealousy? And then, is
the singular being singular at all?
Singular being is endlessly substitutable, each one for the other, each one for all the others.
She is in-different and anonymous. Singular beings are 'coming and going'. Birth/death are
each as the other. Since the singular being depends on nothing, she is an absolute. But at the
same time that she depends on nothing means that nothing can complete her. In that sense, a
singular being is a/ragment. A fragment that can never he completed in herself It.is [hus,
an absolute fragment. What singularises a singular being is the communication With eac~
other in hers irreplaceability. Their irreplaceability, although they do not hav'c access to It
(and the same goes for the irreplaceabiliry of the other/s) is the vcry place of their
singularity. rhe singular being cannot appropriate her O\\'n inep]aceability or the
irreplaceability' of the other. Ne\ertheless, the irreplaceability of one, the same as the
irreplace<.Jbijity of the other. or the irreplaceability of the others, is for the singular being
being~v.·ith-the-others 8y heing with the others (l\ways already, by being \vilh the others as
being with nobody, singular being is being that is always ex-posed: being ex-posed and ex-
position ex~posed. By being ex~posed, and ex-position ex-posed, the singular being is a
being that is ahvays already a being towards the other, in the sense that the other, or th~
othemess of the other, always already comcs 'before' a singular being and therefore It
makes it possible. although never completed. The singular being is a fragment that can
never complete herself in herself, since she is always already the other by being constantly
ex~posed to it. In that sense, a singular being is always coming and going from one to the
other. Thus, the singular being loves. For the singular being existence is love, or to say it
differently. for the singular being thinking is DffirmDtion; thinking is inclusion of the
othemess t)fthe other; thinking is saying yes, again. yes to the other and to the otherness of
the other. Thinking is/as loving and thinking Is/as translating.
Moreover, if a singular being is a heing, and nothing more or nothing less, she
should have a heart. Or more strongly: she sho~ld be heart. She should 'beat' as a heart
beats. If it is still possible to talk about something like the essence of (a singular) being, it is
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Jealous)' 3S a problem and jealousy as an aporia
I will try' to explore these questions in their ambivalence and in their equivocation: jealousy
as a possible stmtegy of subject/ivir)', and jealousy as a possible strategy' 0 f singularity. On
the one hand, J will consider the strategy of jealousy as the strategy that informs the core of
any strategy; and I will elaborate the strategy of strategy as an effect of subject/ivity.
Howcver, on the other hand, r will try to develop the question of jealousy as a possible
"unconscious" strategy, that is to say, as a strategy present at the very place ol/he ah.H?IICe
of any strategy. In both cases the figure of the other will be unavoidable.
According to what was already mentioned about anaJ.ysing jealousy as a possible
strategy at the very place of any strategy. as the strategy of subjeet/ivity, r bl'1ieve that
jealousy in this context could be presented as a problem (problema~prO{eCllOn. [Jl'djecthm).
There is no subject/ivity without problem. In order for subjectlivity to emerge, the subject
has to project but abo to protect himself; moreover. in order to be a subject, he has to
project and protect himself through/from the figure of the other; which means, that the
subject. in order to be a subject has 10 be a jealous subject. The subject in order to be a
subject has to hJve a problem, which is, by the S;jme token, produced within the structure of
the subject/ivity in order to protect that structure. What I would like to point out is that
within this rational, thinkable and, if I could say so, 'logical' logic, onc circulates around
various paradoxes all the time.
Therefore, J would also like to inten'ogate the notion of jealousy not only as .:I
category of ratio, in the sense that one could understand jeijlousy as a fear, as a pr()blem,
but rather in the ClJUrSe where the notion of jealousy could be understood as a category' of
mind My intention is to explore jeDlousy as a (possible) category" of mind ill the sense or
being an apurio, or being aporetic experience. Jealousy would then be the category of mind
where the unknown guest could always surprise us. but in the mode of not knowing that
(one is) surprise,id, To be surprised by not kno\ving that onc is surprised, by forgetting it
(......'hich could be perhaps luve). is a kind of impussi:: the aporia and aporetic experience of
something that is going to happen. With such a question I believe one is at the very place of
paradox, or the category of an aporia par excellence. If I succeed in cJaiminrr that it is
. .
pOSSible to present jealousy as an aporiil, it would not be possible anymore to constitute
Jealousy as a problem, as the limit, or ,is any kind of border considering thi,; possession,
projection and protection of/from the other. And if It is not pt)ssibJc to constilute jCJ.lousy as
a problem anymorc, then it also means that it is impossible to constiwte any kind of
problem as such ~since with all aporia one is facing thc [Jarl1/l'sis of what is thinkable and
re~presentable, the Inferruj)tion of the cil'eular structure of the absolute know!ed(le the
e'
nonpassage, anu the ex-position to the other wh ich should not have any limits, or any
borders to be crosseu. This could mean the possibility to think jealousy as something that
will no longer sen'e as a structure that is necessary for subject/iviry to emerge in the sense
being at the very place of knowledge (understood as subject of 'rational knowledge'), and
the concept of "singular being" -by applying the pronoun "he" \vhen speaking about
subject, and, respectively, applyillg "she" when speaking abt)ut ~ingLllar being. This re·
shaping of the trauitionaJ map of Jichotomics, though seemingly speculative and
reproducing the binary structure, has a different content. "He", the subjccL is constituted on
the exclusion of "she", thus "he" stands for the mark of separation, namely of subject/ivity.
"She", the singular being, is based on inclusion of "he" and "she" -in the sense that "she" is
before "he" -excluding- "she".
'Ioye·mare'
Ever since I decided to work on the issue of jealousy I have been asked if I consider the
notion of jealousy as nec~ssarily related to the notion of love. All these variouS versions of
"All people do not die in the same way.
lhroughout time, they hav.:: not died in the same way".
(Dcrrida, 1993, p. 43)
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sexes that corresponds to the multiplicity of desires, instead of the traditional concept of
sexuality based on a desire in which lack is always already inscribed. I am opting for
multiplicity of bodies and pleasures. ~n this sl'n~e a wot.nan, a sin.gul~r being is related to
any position in the form of relation Without relatlO.n. A sl~gular bcmg I~ pu:e openness and
experience as such. Present in its presence; nothmg behmd and n?thm? ~n .front; t.hus, a
singular being is as such an aporia. She is con,stantly open, but smce It IS ImpossLble to
open something that is always already open, s?e IS closed. .,
J would like to recall here a questlon of sexual dlfterence; What about st:xual
difference considering singular beings? r would like to state thm in the concept of
sinvularity sexual difference (understood traditionally as a difference between only tl,l,'O
ide~titiable sexes) is not inscribed. I would also like to recall a few already mentioned
characteristics of a singular being. It is anonymous; it is every/one, it is not necessarBy
human, it is not a part of any order and consequently does not know any differences.
Nevertheless, I would say, if one insists on the existence of sexual difference, then lhe
singular being is a woman, but a \voman that is not any~.ore opposed ~o the man, t?US a
womdn as a 'hypothdical' plact: ofsubwfSioll o[s~xual dl1[erenc~. In lhIS sense, one IS not
talking here about the , ..'oman ~s the onc that is opposed to man as his other and thus as a
constituted (sexual) difference in the sphere of rationality and knowledge, but rather about a
woman whose other is not anymore man but rhe other's other. Any/other. Every/other. An
anonymous other in its othemess. _ .
And I am claiming this because I believe that the place ot woman IS not a place
and a position but rather an ex·position. That the woman is the one who is being; 'on both
sides' of any border, and thus is a being capable of the mterruption of what is knowable.
Consequently. she is by' that very gesture of being able to interrupt. the structu~e o~- the
knowable, of the reasonable, on the side of what is not knowable Without kno\\'mg 11, as
\'t'ell as on the side of what is knowable although w'ithout knO\ving it. Thus she produces the
aporw, or that is to sa}', she is an aporia herself, as the result of renouncing any structure,
any border and any limit, of renouncing any end.
Did [lose my trace ofa singular being's possiblejealotlsy? Or, did] lost my t:acc
of her jealousy, as 1 decided to place, but not to posit singular being as female. _I ?eileve
that I diu not. ·Without mentioning the term jealousy·, we arc at tile yery place at slllgular
being's jealousy; at the place that is not place, at the position thilt is not a position: at the
relation to the other lhat is a relation only and as much as il is not. But, that is a relatIOn that
comes "before" an)' position, that comes before "me" llnd before "you" Precisely because
of her openness, because of her coming and going from one to an/other. and because of her
ex-position, one could perhaps talk about jealousy of a singular being. About jcal~usy that
in thi~ case reprl'sents a kind of necessity of relming oneself to the other. AboUl J~alousy,
which is also in its uniqueness and in its singularity ne\er completely and fully lrunslated,
but rather lranshlll1hle.
Lee/ora, 8 (2002)
something like the heart, although always already the broken heart. and only in that sense
the heart. Singular being is constantly repeating "yes. I am here". "Yes, I am here and I am
responding to you." By responding to the othemcss of the other, singular bt:ing rt:i:1ches the
concept of the responsibility. In that sense, by constantly saying yes to the other, singular
being is thus, responsible in her responding, affirming, loving and welcoming the other in
his/h~r otht:rness.
In this respect, one of the questions that this text is posing is -who and what as the
other/s might arrive to the "singular being" since it could be anyone or anything. Hence,
unexpected. Hence, always in a form of a surprise.
The absolute arrivant is not even a guest. He surprises the host. He surprises the
one who is ex.posed by being always already a response of the oth~r, or by bcing always
already a response of the absolute arrivant.
I believe that this constant possibility of arriving of the absolute arr(viint coutd be,
perhaps, the place for us to explore ho",,! and in which sense one can argue about the
pOSSibility of a singular being being jealous.
Whcn one is speaking about the absolute arrivant the question that immediately
appears is: in this arriving of the arrival, in th~s arriving of the event, and in this arriving of
the otherness of the other ·who is the host and who is the guest?
"But if the new arrivant who arrives is new, onc must expect ·without waiting for
him or her, without expecting it- that he does not simply cross a given threshold. Such an
arrivant affects the very experience of the threshold, whose possibility he thus brings to
light before one even knows whether there has been an invitation, a call, a nomination, Or a
promise (Verheissung. Hcissen, etc.) What we could hcre call thc arrivant, the most arrivant
among all arrivams, the arrivant par excellence, is whatever, whoever, in arriving, dues not
cross a threshold separating two identifiable places, the proper and the foreign, the proper
oftbe one and the proper of the other..
Speaking about the absolute arrivam, the host is not the host since in order to be an
arrivant he/she should be neither awaited nor expectcd. And what about the guest? The
guest, as arrivant, as a new guest, in order to be 'new' should not he a gueST at all, since
there is no host tor such a guest. In a way, the host becomes a !west and a guest becomes a
host. ~ c
The guest, the host, in its singularir)' that does not separate iU\.:IlLiliable places. could be any
other in its otherness, where the other is thought as a person, as nation, as race, as class, as
language. as the world.
Hence, a singular being cannot neither 'protect' or 'project', nor sa\c her identitv.
Being a pure openness, a singular being is always possibly the other whom she does n~t
know and does not expect. In that sense, as it v.as mentioned above the singular being is the
one that is ex-posed and ex-position ex-posed to any new arrivant, to any o(hemess.
A singular being is a being that is 'coming and going'; but, also a being that IS
coming os going and going as coming. In that sense, the singular being is the being that is
always a:ready on 'both sides' of any border, of any limit, and of an)' end; thus, the singular
being is the veT)' place where tl',ere are no more borders. \10 more limits and no mort' end".
Her ex-position is not an)''1I1ore a position, In this sense, she is beyond any position, which
also means that she is llot any position. Precisely because she is never in opposition, she
does not have a position and vice versa since she does not assume any posilion, she does
not kno\\ any position. This does not mean a reversal of the symbolical hierarchy between
man and women; it also does not mean a phantasmatic imposition of an excIusively female
homosexual paradise. Woman IS hert: introduced as another name for the multiplicity of
the same question might be reduced to the following ones: Can one be jealous withoutlove? Or, a similar question but nevertheless not the same at all -is there any· jealousy
without love? Or, perhaps, is there any love without jealousy? I had great difticulties in
answering these questions although I \\'as answering !hem in a way all the time. I \\135
answering them even before I was asked; although real difficulties appeared together withthese concrete and direct questions. 1 was answering all these questions through thinking
and translating the notion of jealousy as such. I was answering them through constantly
rranslating the nOlion of jealulIsy from/in my native (Serbian) language. The \vord forjealousy in Serbian is 'lj'ubo-mora '. What I would like to point out is that, to myknowledge, there is no other language where the \\'ord love ( 'ljubav') appears as inscribedin the notion of jealousy. The only similarity that I could find \.\/ith other languages was
wilh the German term for jealousy -Eifersucht. Although, the difference is still great. TheGerman term 'sucht' implies something similar to the notion of 'mora' in the Serbian
version of the term. But still, it is not 'mare of love' at stake, but rather the German termimplies something like an illness, Or even more madness caused by the affects and passion.The literal translation of the Serbian tarn for jealousy is -- 'love-mare '. And as itis, for example, with the 'night-mare', one does not ask oneself, or one cannot easily
answer the question, since one cannot apprehend such a question: is 'night-mare'
necessarily related to 'night' or not? Is it a 'mare' because it is a 'night', or is it a 'night'because 'night' as such implies always already a ~ind of 'mare'?
Let us return to Derrida's remark from the beginning of this paragraph: If, asDen'ida suggests, culture is always a history of dying, the culture of dying, apprehension ofdeath, exchanging death or living death through translating from one (language) to
an/o/her, exchanging and thus translating death - it is possible to ask \\'hat kind of culture(of dying) it is, or how onc dies in the language, in the history (of dying), and in the culture,
which is named as the Serbian language and Serbian culture'? And ho\,,' onc exchanges thatdeath, or that culture (of death) in translating jealousy as a "love-mare"? Or, in translating
'love-mare' as .Jeulous:}'? And then, how onc exchanges, generally speaking, death inthinking and re-thinking jealousy as a translation from one language to an'ol!Jer language?In its coming and going from one language to an/other? How does one die in a language
and culture, wherein love is necessarily insnibed in the notion of jealousy? And t)1'.:n, how
one does translate and rhus cross the border (of death) of such a term where love is
necessarily inscribed in jealousy? Can one ask -isn't love as such al ...,'ays (possihly) a mare')And if it is so, what kind of mare is one speaking of? The mare of im/possibility? The mare
of perhaps, possible impossibility'? Possible because impossible? Or even, the marc of.perhaps -the impossible because possible?
Perhaps, \\'hat else couid be said about it at this point in my work is that whiletranslating from one {Serbian language) to an/olher (the English language) and in thisparticular case the word 'lj'lIbo-mora' (love-mare) translating it as the term 'jealousy', it
appears that in this 'process' of translating I have discovered that the process of translating
as such rt'tains all these possihle ambiguities, considering translating any/one to any/otherin this case, language. Thus thinking as translating and translating as thinking the term(changing and ex-changing one death for an/other?) rhe concept of jealousy becomes that
very place of the aporia: a paralysing moment of rationality, hence calculability, hence
circularity of rh inking. It becomes the place that is dis-pJaced, the lime as timeless in thL'
sense of constant 'coming and go;ng', the place \vhere jealousy as such disappears as aproblem. In translating, is it possible that I have experienced this voyage, this passage thatis erasing the border between presence and absence, where presence becomes absence and
Onc would ii~e lo think, each timc, ill a single Jangu:lge, \vhich \vould be [helanguage or thought. 11uI tirUllly Olll': "re~lb as one dre:lIl1s, and onc often dreams in a I?reignt()n-~lle: 11 15 the dream itself, this ruse, that makes us c;;pl'"ak III an unknown spee(h, diverse,
mui-tip1e nhs(urc in its lr(m~r;lrcncy. (1 097. r· 149)
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absence becomes presence? Did jealousy, as such, \\,hile translat!ng it t.o the other(language) seduced me and ex-posed me to the aporia, or to the aporetlc expenenee or - to
the experience as such.
. . .Another question that imposes itself on me reads as follows: IS J.ealousy only athing that concerns Ji\'ing beings? Since jealousy as such appears as translatIOn, and thus as
Sage a trespass from one to the other, from presence to absence and from absence toa pas, " k 'f h h d de 'coming and gOing' from one to the other, can one as ]. per aps t e ea arepresenc , , " 'b I'J 'ealous? One has "reat difficultIes glvmg answers to such questiOns, because, I e leve,a sa J 0
• 'h h" dh estions face us with the 'mare' at the paradox, or Wit t e mare as para ox, orsue qu
, 'k' d f'perhaps with the 'mare' of the aporia? And thus, one IS faced With a m o. Impasse.Furthennore, do all these questions lead us somewhere, or are they the first SIgn of the
already mentioned 'para(rsis' of thinking, or paralysis of what is thinkable? Do, thesequestions lead us to the border wher~ one faces th~ non-thinkabl~, ~he border t~~t IS th.us
even not a border anymore, at that pomt where one IS unable to thll1k anymore ~ the pomt
of the non-dialectical passage from one to the other" (Nancy, 1997, p, 10), The passagefrom one to the other that is not anymore its, and thus the opposed ~ther, ?ut ra~her the
other that is not anymore its other but the other's other? Is th~ most frl~htenl.ng P?mt -the
non-logical, non-reasonable, 'mad' point ~where something anses fro~ ItS a~tl1heSlS, where
the possible arises from the imposslb1e, life from death and death trom iJfe, where truth
arises from error, where love arises from non-love?
Jf the other which comes and cuts acrOSS me is the other language, that meansperhaps, that One is thinking in one language as alw~ys already being cut. an? cr~ssed ~,iththe other language, which could mean that one IS always {.lJready thmkmg 10 se\erallanguages. Thus, thinking again appears as translating. B,ut what breaks the heart of one(language) in crossing with the other (language)? Blanchot s remark:
In the process of translating fTom one to un/olher to become je,alous (in t~e sense
of jealousy translated as a 'love-mare'), of not being capable of not lovmg and bemg opento\~ards the other/s; however, one is always trembling in front of rhe otherness of ~he other
(lanouagc') preciselv because what ties us to the other in hisiller othemess is what IS elos.estb ' ,
, 1 h' an thmkto us. Perhaps, what is closest to the heart. Perhaps, that IS love. n t IS sense, one c
abvut jealous\' understood as an unavoidable urge of destining one/se! f to the other; ofjealousy as a~l unavoidable urge of having a broken heart, and thus having a heart; o~jealousy understood as not being capable not to be always already ex-p~s~d ro the other.. ~jealousy understood as love for the other in his/her othernes~ although It IS always posslb y
a' love-mare'? In other words ... (_ .. but it is a matter of nothmg but that, other words).
BlagojevicLeetora,8 (2002)
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